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Transition to electronic trading of Kansas City Board of Trade wheat futures  
 
This study compares liquidity costs and other characteristics of electronic and open outcry hard 
red winter wheat futures contracts traded on the Kansas City Board of Trade. Liquidity costs are 
considerably lower in the electronic market than in the open outcry market. A new approach is 
used to estimate liquidity costs which eliminates bias resulting from splitting of orders in 
electronic markets. The liquidity costs are still considerably lower after correcting the bias in 
electronic market. Liquidity costs were higher in after-hours trading as compared to regular 
trading hours suggesting a negative impact of volume on liquidity costs. Volatility of futures 
prices and volume per trade are positively related to liquidity costs, while a negative relation is 
found between daily volume and liquidity costs. Round-number pricing is more prevalent in the 
open outcry market. Daily volumes were found distinctively higher during the rolling period as a 
result of Goldman-Sachs Roll. Trade size is larger in the open outcry market. 
Key words: bid-ask spread, electronic trading, execution costs, KCBT, liquidity  
 
Introduction 
Futures and options exchanges worldwide are shifting from conventional open outcry markets to 
electronic trading. Reasons for this shift include reduced transaction costs, less trading errors, 
and increased speed of execution. Electronic trading eliminates the costs of maintaining a 
physical site for floor trading. As argued by Martens (1998), an open outcry trading system is 
comparable to a dealership market, in which traders can trade with competing market makers at 
their publicly announced bids and asks, while an electronic trading mechanism is comparable to 
a continuous auction system with automatic order matching in which traders communicate only 
via computer screens.  Electronic trading requires an open limit order book, which enhances 
market transparency, improves dissemination of updated prices, and speeds order execution. 
Previous works have studied the effects of the migration from open outcry to electronic trading 
on relative efficiency, execution costs, and informational efficiency and show that an incentive 
exists for this migration. Examples of such work include Chung and Chiang (2006), Ates and 2 
 
Wang (2005), Bloomfield, O’hara, and Saar (2005), Aitken, Frino, Hill, and Jarnecic (2004), Tse 
and Zabotina (2001), Blennerhasset and Bowman (1998), Frino, McInish, and Toner (1998), 
Martens (1998) and Pirrong (1996).  Frank and Garcia (2009) and Bryant and Haigh (2004) 
attempted to determine the impact of electronic markets on liquidity costs of agricultural 
commodities futures contracts, but neither of the two studies explicitly measured liquidity costs 
in electronic markets. None of the previous studies used the same measures to estimate liquidity 
costs in both electronic and open outcry markets which provide fair comparison between the two 
markets. The present study estimates and compares liquidity costs in  traditional open-outcry 
market and the new electronic market at Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT) using Roll’s 
measure and average absolute price deviation as measures of liquidity costs. 
The KCBT introduced electronic trading on the CME Globex® platform on January 14, 
2008. This shift sought to provide high-speed trade execution, direct market access, and central 
counterparty clearing to achieve fairness, transparency, and anonymity in trading. At KCBT, 
both electronic and open-outcry markets co-exist which provides a favorable scenario to compare 
both markets.  A new approach is used to estimate liquidity cost which eliminates bias resulting 
from splitting of orders in electronic market. The study identifies the impact of different factors 
such as daily volume, volume per trade, and price volatility on liquidity costs. A probable impact 
of Goldman-Sachs roll on daily volumes of KCBT open outcry markets is examined and higher 
trading volumes are found during the roll period. This study also examines the occurrence of 
round number pricing in both electronic and open outcry markets. The results of this study will 
help hedgers and speculators understand various aspects of both market environments and aid in 
their business decisions. The results of this study will also help regulators and exchange 
management increase fairness and efficiency in the market. 3 
 
Theory 
To compare electronic and open-outcry trading, the first requirement is to understand the 
execution of the orders in both trading environments. At KCBT, open-outcry trading occurs on a 
trading floor where members (traders) trade continuously through open outcry. Traders publicly 
announce bid and ask prices. If a trader finds a bid or ask attractive, the trader simply sells at the 
bid or buys at the ask price. The transaction price is then made public. Quotes are valid only for a 
short time. A trader can also request a quote, and then may accept the best price or refuse to 
trade. When there are multiple traders with the same offer or ask, the buyer or seller can choose 
with whom to trade. As no official market maker is present on the KCBT floor, an official order 
book does not exist. Names of traders are not published by the exchange. This information is 
immediately available only to the people on the floor.  
Electronic trading is a continuous auction system with automatic order matching in which 
traders communicate only via computer screens without revealing their names. If two orders can 
be matched, then the automatic auction mechanism chooses as matching orders those with the 
best prices. For multiple identical best bids or asks, the trade is assigned to the order that has 
been in the system the longest time. Large orders that exceed the limit order of the quote are split 
up over more quotes according to price and the time the quote entered the system. Information 
on transaction prices and volumes is published instantaneously in the electronic system. A quote 
is valid until it is explicitly withdrawn from the system.  
One of the apparent differences between the two trading systems is the limit order book. 
In electronic trading, traders have access to an anonymous limit order book, while in open-outcry 
trading, no official limit order book exists. However, identities and the behavior of other traders 4 
 
can be observed on the floor. Another important difference between these two trading systems is 
the execution of orders. In electronic trading, a large order can be matched with several orders of 
the limit order book at different prices. On the other hand, in open-outcry trading, an order is 
sometimes executed at one price only. Therefore, the argument is that large investors get a better 
deal in open-outcry markets than in electronic markets. Moreover, the electronic market’s splits 
in order matching create downward bias in estimates of liquidity costs when price changes are 
used for estimating liquidity costs. No previous study of liquidity costs in electronic markets has 
identified this bias. To eliminate this bias, probable splits in the dataset are identified and 
aggregated to represent one order and then separate estimates of liquidity costs are calculated. 
In heavily traded commodity futures markets such as wheat and corn, although volume 
per trade is higher in open-outcry markets, total volume and number of trades are generally 
higher in electronic markets because it facilitates fast order matching and trade execution. Due to 
this high activity in electronic environment and a quicker dissemination of information, liquidity 
costs (except possibly for large orders) seem to be lower in electronic trading as compared to the 
open-outcry system. 
Borchardt (2006, p. 13) prior to the opening of side-by-side trading at the KCBT offered 
this explanation of why large traders would prefer open outcry: 
  Personally, I truly believe that the liquidity will still rest in the trading pits during open 
outcry, but what you may see is that some of the small orders, that are more of a nuisance 
to the pit than they are a help, may bleed over to the electronic system to be executed. … 
But, the liquidity will still reside in the pit. When I first came to the exchange back in 
1982, you’d go down to the floor, and if someone was trading 10 or 20 contracts, that was 
a pretty good size. And 50 contracts was huge! Now everybody in the pit will trade 50, 
and most of them will trade 100, and there is a core group of people down there who will 
trade 300 to 500 contracts at a time. They’re the true liquidity providers, the depth that’s 
needed for the big commercials and for the financial monies that are flowing into the 
exchange. 5 
 
Several past studies across different market structures and financial instruments have 
observed price clustering at round numbers. Price clustering is the preference for some prices 
over others. Three main hypotheses have been proposed in the literature to explain the clustering 
of prices: the negotiation hypothesis, the collusion hypothesis, and the attraction hypothesis 
(Klumpp, Brorsen, and Anderson 2007). According to the negotiation hypothesis, developed by 
Harris (1991), traders use a limited number of price points to simplify and reduce the cost of 
negotiation. If less price points are used, negotiations converge rapidly, avoiding frivolous offers 
and counteroffers. The collusion hypothesis, proposed by Christie and Schultz (1994), argues 
that clustering is caused by implicit collusion of traders. The attraction hypothesis, also referred 
to as the natural clustering hypothesis, states that clustering is the result of a psychological 
preference of some price points (Ascioglu, Comerton-Forde, and McInish 2007). The present 
study examines price clustering in both electronic and open outcry wheat futures markets. The 
anonymity of the electronic market likely prevents negotiation of price or collusion. Therefore, if 
price clustering is observed in the electronic market, it is more likely the result of natural 
clustering or an attraction to particular numbers. However, in open outcry markets, the trades, 
especially large orders, can be implicitly negotiated on the trading pit by the floor traders, which 
might lead to choosing whole numbers. Further, electronic markets have less need for the 
simplification of round numbers compared to open outcry markets since the bids and offers are 
often set by computers. Hence, the open outcry market is expected to have more round number 
pricing. 
The three factors expected to affect liquidity costs in both trading systems are daily 
volume, volatility, and volume per trade. Previous work on liquidity in futures markets finds that 
liquidity costs and trading volume are negatively correlated while liquidity costs and price 6 
 
variability are positively related (Thompson and Waller 1988; Brorsen 1989; Thompson, Eales, 
and Seibold 1993; Bryant and Haigh 2004; Frank and Garcia 2009). This effect occurs because 
in high volume markets, traders trade with little price effect to their transactions. However, in 
thin markets, the transactions of individual traders may have significant price effects and may 
therefore result in higher liquidity costs. This result is also one of the reasons why liquidity costs 
in electronic markets are expected to be lower than those of open-outcry markets. Conversely, in 
a volatile market, traders, especially intra-day traders, face high risk from holding inventory so 
they increase their bid-ask spread. Hence, volatility is expected to have a positive relation with 
liquidity cost. The third factor believed to affect liquidity costs is volume per trade. In the 
electronic market, high volume orders may not be filled at a single price. In the open outcry 
market, a scalper may have a higher bid-ask spread for the largest orders.  
Data 
The intraday prices used in this study are the tick data for hard red winter wheat futures contracts 
traded at the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT 2008). At KCBT, wheat futures contracts are 
traded with five expiration months: March, May, June, September, and December. The database 
contains a record of each trade price of the five contracts traded by both open outcry and 
electronic methods in 2008.  Regular trading hours for open outcry trading at KCBT are 9:30 
a.m. to 1:15 p.m. Monday through Friday. The electronic market operates during regular trading 
hours and 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. Sunday through Friday. One trading day for electronic trading 
is considered from 6:00 p.m. through 1:15 p.m. of the next day.  Daily volumes for each contract 




The  bid-ask  spread  is  an  accepted  measure  of  liquidity  cost  in  security  and  futures 
markets. As bid-ask quotes for futures markets are not recorded by the exchange, two proxies of 
bid-ask spread are used to measure the liquidity costs: Roll’s measure and average absolute 
deviation.  According  to  Roll  (1984)  if  markets  are  informationally  efficient,  the  covariance 
between price changes is negative and directly related to the bid-ask spread.  Roll’s measure is 
calculated using the following formula: 
(1)  , 
where   is the change in wheat price at time t. Roll’s measure is more precise with more 
frequent  observations  since  most  price  movements  will  be  due  to  scalping  rather  than  to 
information trades. The other accepted proxy for the bid-ask spread was proposed by Thompson 
and Waller (1987), who suggest that the average absolute value of price changes as a direct 
measure of the average execution cost of trading. Average absolute price changes are calculated 
as  
(2)     
The liquidity costs for the five contracts are estimated in both electronic and open outcry 
futures markets using Roll’s measure and average absolute mean deviations. Each measure is 
calculated for each day and then averaged for the life of the contract weighted by daily number 
of trades. For regression and other analysis in the study, average absolute price deviation is used 
as the measure of liquidity costs.  8 
 
In electronic markets, if the market order is larger than available limit orders, the large 
order is split into smaller orders and matched with two or more limit orders sometimes at 
different prices. This practice results in biased estimates of liquidity costs when measures such as 
Roll’s measure and average absolute price changes are used to estimate liquidity costs.  To 
overcome this bias, all probable splits in the dataset are identified. In electronic markets, 
matched trades are time stamped with the precision of seconds. All the trades occurring at the 
same time (same second) in a day are averaged and treated as a single observation. Then average 
absolute price deviations are calculated from the reduced dataset and referred to as aggregate 
average absolute price deviations.   
To test hypotheses about factors influencing liquidity costs, the following regression 
equation is estimated by restricted maximum likelihood: 
(3)    , 
where   is average absolute price change on day   and maturity month i,   is volume per 
trade on day  ,   is total volume on day  ,   is price volatility measured as range of price on 
day  ,   is random effect of trading day.   and   are assumed independently distributed 
normal with mean 0 and variance   and  , respectively. The estimates of   are all zero and 
thus the model is equivalent to ordinary least squares. Separate regressions are estimated for 
open-outcry, the electronic market, and the electronic market with aggregate trades.  
Results 
Descriptive statistics of number of trades and volumes are in Table 1.  Average trades per day for 
electronic markets are immensely higher than for open-outcry markets. However, average 
volumes per trade for electronic markets are considerably lower than that of open-outcry 9 
 
markets. The small trade size in the electronic market might be partly due to splitting of large 
orders with electronic trading. However, as argued by Martens (1998), in electronic markets, 
risk-averse traders can more easily break up their large orders and place smaller orders at 
different prices to protect themselves from adverse selection than in open-outcry markets.  
Monthly volumes for electronic and open outcry markets are shown in figure 1. The daily 
volume of the July 2008 contract for electronic and open-outcry contracts is presented in Figure 
2.  Daily volumes of electronic contracts are higher than those of open outcry contracts 
throughout the life of the contracts except for a few occasions. Total volume traded in wheat 
electronic futures markets during 2008 at KCBT was 1,882,302 contracts compared to 1,033,741 
contracts in open outcry markets (KCBT 2008). The electronic market had a higher market share 
and dominated the open outcry market. 
  The liquidity costs for the five contracts in both electronic and open outcry futures 
markets are presented in Table 2. The average Roll’s measure for electronic markets ranges from 
0.28 cents per bushel to 0.88 cents per bushel while for open outcry, it ranges from 1.18 cents per 
bushel to 2.17 cents per bushel. This result indicates that the electronic market has lower 
liquidity cost. Shah and Brorsen (2009) estimate the same measures for June 2007 open outcry 
wheat futures contract. They report Roll’s measure of 0.45 cents per bushel and average absolute 
mean deviation of 0.49 cents per bushel. Thompson, Eales, and Seibold (1993) also estimate the 
same measures for selected 1985 KCBT wheat contracts. Their estimates of average absolute 
deviations
1 are 0.26-0.29 cents per bushel for highly traded contracts, but are about double these 
values for lightly traded contracts such as the March contract during March or the September 
                                                           
1  The dataset used by Thompson, Eales, and Seibold (1993) only recorded observations when prices changed. 
When the zero price changes are deleted, our estimates of liquidity costs increase by 42.63 and 46.16 per cent in 
open-outcry and electronic markets, respectively. 10 
 
contract in February. Our estimates of Roll’s measure and average absolute mean deviation for 
June 2008 open outcry contract are 1.18 and 1.23 cents per bushels, respectively. The reasons 
behind higher liquidity costs in 2008, as compared to 2007 for the same contract, are lower 
volumes, high prices, and high volatility in 2008. The total trading volumes for wheat futures 
markets in 2007 at KCBT were 4,318,007 contracts with only 3,778,266 contracts in 2008 
(KCBT 2008). With the higher prices and higher price volatility in 2008, the risk associated with 
scalping clearly increased, which resulted in higher liquidity costs.  
The average absolute deviations are also considerably lower in electronic markets than in 
open outcry markets. The average absolute price deviations for electronic markets range from 
0.26 to 0.70 cents per bushel. In electronic markets, if no limit order of matching size is available 
at the time for a large market order, the order matching system splits the large market order and 
matches it with several smaller limit orders depending upon the size of the market order and 
available limit orders. The result is several trades at the same time instead of a single trade for 
the market order. The frequency of the number of trades occurring at the same time in both 
electronic and open outcry markets is presented in Table 3. The numbers reveal a much higher 
number of trades occurring at the same time in the electronic market than in the open-outcry 
market. This result is evidence of the splitting of large orders in the electronic market. To 
mitigate the bias of average absolute price deviation estimates created by splitting larger orders 
in the electronic market, aggregate average absolute price deviations are used (Table 2). The 
estimates of aggregate average absolute price deviation range from 0.33 to 0.89 cents per bushel, 
which are higher than the non-aggregate trades, but still lower than those for the open outcry 
market.  11 
 
  Figure 3 shows the number of trades by time of day. The open outcry market opens at 
9:30 and closes at 1:15. The inverted U shape for number of trades is at least partly due to the 
length of time periods not being equal. What is striking about figure 3 is how few electronic 
trades occur outside the hours of operation for open outcry. Average liquidity cost at different 
times of the day, calculated by segmenting total trading hours in one-hour intervals is presented 
in Figure 4. The figure shows that liquidity costs are larger in the open outcry market at both the 
open and the close. Ekman (1992) argues that information traders are more likely to trade at the 
open and close, and that is when price movements occur. Such changes in equilibrium prices 
would increase the estimate of liquidity costs. The electronic market shows greater liquidity costs 
outside regular trading hours, which could explain the small volume.  
The Goldman-Sachs index fund traded substantial long positions during 2008. When the 
fund rolled its positions into the next contract month (Goldman-Sachs Roll 2009), it could have 
also caused greater price movement, especially at the close. The Goldman-Sachs roll occurs on 
the fifth through the ninth business day of the month prior to the expiration month in open-outcry 
market at KCBT. Figure 5 presents average daily volume in penultimate contract months for the 
five contracts under investigation. The daily volumes on the rolling period are distinctively 
higher than other business days especially the 5
th, 7
th and 9
th business days.   
At KCBT, wheat contracts are traded at prices with precision of 2/8, 4/8 or 6/8 of a cent. 
Hence, the ending digits after the decimal point of any price can only be 0, 25, 50 or 75.  Figure 
6 shows the frequency of prices ending in the four possible digits.  The figure shows that the 
clustering of prices to whole numbers is much more prevalent in the open outcry market than in 
the electronic market. In the open outcry market, almost 78 percent of prices are whole numbers 
compared to 35 percent in the electronic market. The preference of whole number prices in the 12 
 
wheat open outcry futures market is consistent with the negotiation hypothesis proposed by 
Harris (1991).  
Linear regression is used to determine the relationship between liquidity cost, volatility, 
average volume per trade, and total daily volume of the contract. The results of the regression for 
open outcry and electronic markets are presented in Table 4. The results show a significant 
negative effect of daily volume on the liquidity costs for both electronic and open outcry 
markets, showing that higher volumes imply less risk of holding contracts resulting in lower 
liquidity costs. A significant impact of price volatility on liquidity costs is found in both markets. 
However, the sensitivity of liquidity cost to price volatility is less in the electronic market than in 
open-outcry. The direction of the effects of total volume and volatility are consistent with 
findings by Thompson and Waller (1987), Thompson, Eales, and Seibold (1993), and Bryant and 
Haigh (2004). The average volume per trade shows a positive significant impact on liquidity 
costs, indicating that traders face risk in holding larger contracts, which results in higher liquidity 
cost.  
Summary and Conclusion 
The objectives of this study are to determine and compare liquidity costs in the open outcry 
futures market and the electronic futures market and determine the factors affecting these 
liquidity costs. To meet the objectives, intraday prices of five hard red winter wheat futures 
contracts traded on Kansas City Board of Trade exchange during 2008 are used. Roll’s measure 
and average absolute price deviations are used to estimate liquidity costs. The average Roll’s 
measure for electronic markets ranges from 0.53 cents per bushels to 1.43 cent per bushel while 
for open outcry markets it ranges from 1.23 cents per bushel to 2.71 cents per bushel. Both 
measures of liquidity costs are considerably lower in the electronic market than in the open 13 
 
outcry futures market. The order matching system in electronic markets splits large orders into 
smaller orders when the corresponding limit order is for a smaller size, which creates a 
downward bias in estimates of liquidity costs. After correcting this bias, liquidity costs are still 
considerably less in the electronic market. Trading volumes are higher in open outcry markets 
during the Goldman-Sachs Roll period. Most trades in the open outcry market are at whole 
number prices, but not in the electronic market. Higher trading volume in electronic markets is 
one explanation of lower liquidity costs in this market. The regression results suggest a negative 
relation between liquidity costs and daily volume while volume per trade has a positive impact 
on liquidity costs in both electronic and open-outcry markets.  
Except for large orders, liquidity costs are less in electronic futures markets than in open 
outcry futures markets. The key to continued existence of the open outcry market appears to be 
its ability to handle large orders. One question is, how can exchanges redesign electronic markets 
so that they are more attractive to large traders? A move to entirely electronic markets may 
require the largest orders to be executed off the exchange or may require large traders to take on 
the role of the scalper and submit a series of smaller orders that are executed sequentially rather 
than all at once. The results clearly support the use of the electronic market for all but the largest 
traders. 
   14 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Wheat Futures Contracts Traded at KCBT in 2008 
Contract 










March  51  132.02  57.33 
(92.21) 
51  1000.31  23.74 
(66.36) 
May  93  85.08  45.50 
(78.37) 
93  610.55  38.93 
(220.93) 
June  134  167.01  23.67 
(13.13) 
134  1194.60  3.67 
(2.37) 
Sep  177  84.60  27.89 
(36.94) 
85  1417.75  5.24 
(5.79) 
Dec  241  72.04  33.97 
(21.67) 
241  991.13  3.62 
(3.04) 
Note: Values in parenthesis are standard deviations. Average volume is number of 5000 bushel contracts.   
 
Table 2. Measures of Liquidity Costs (cents/bushel) in Wheat Futures Contracts Traded at 
KCBT in 2008 
Contract 
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Table 3. Frequency of Number of Trades Traded at the Same Time in Wheat Futures 
Contracts at KCBT in 2008 
Number of Trades at the 
Same Time 
Frequency 
Electronic Market  Open-outcry Market 
1  321527  69083 
2  73885  137 
3  23075  1 
4  8915  0 
5  3827  0 
6  1970  0 
7  1019  0 
8  577  0 
9  318  0 
10  191  0 
11  120  0 
12  88  0 
13  49  0 
14  39  0 
15  24  0 
16  15  0 
17  14  0 
18  10  0 
19  5  0 
20  1  0 
21  1  0 
22  1  0 
23  1  0 
 
 
Table 4. Regressions with Average Absolute Price Change as Dependent Variable 
Market  N  Intercept  Range  Volume per Trade  Total Volume   


















































































Figure 2. Daily volume of electronic and open-outcry july 2008 wheat futures contracts 
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Figure 5. Average daily volume in penultimate contract months of KCBT HRW 
















Figure 6. Ending values of trade price in electronic and open out-cry markets at 
KCBT in 200819 
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